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ABSTRACT 
In this essay, I offer a vindication of pride. I start by presenting the Christian 
condemnation of pride as the cardinal sin. I subsequently examine Mandeville’s line of 
argument whereby pride is beneficial to society, although remaining a vice for the 
individual. Finally, I focus on, and endorse, the analysis of pride formulated by Hume, 
for whom pride qualifies instead as a virtue. This is because pride not only contributes 
to making society flourish but also stabilizes the virtuous agent by creating a virtuous 
circle between our desire for self-appraisal and our aspiration to act morally. I 
conclude by underscoring the (virtuous) connection between pride and modesty, 
concomitantly arguing that humility should be discarded as vicious. 
1. Introduction: The Sin of Pride 
 
Pride is identified by the Christian tradition as the Cardinal Sin. In Sirach 
(verses 12–13) it is said that «[t]he beginning of human pride Lord; the heart 
has withdrawn from its Maker. For the beginning of pride is sin, and the one who 
clings to it pours out abominations. Therefore the Lord brings upon them 
unheard-of calamities, and destroys them completely». By being proud one gives 
excessive importance to oneself, to the point of neglecting God. Because of that, 
pride represents the root of all the other vices. Referring to Sirach, Augustine 
reaffirms that «“pride is the beginning of all sins”. And what is pride but an 
appetite for inordinate exaltation?» (Augustine, 2008, bk. 14, ch. 13, p. 380). 
After Augustine, the same reference can be found in Gregory the Great – who 
speaks of pride as «the queen of sins […] the root of all evil […] the beginning of 
all sins» (Gregory the Great, 1844–1850, vol. 3, bk. 31, ch. 45, para. 87, pp. 
489–490) – and then in Aquinas: «the Wise Man [i.e. Ben Sira, the author of 
Sirach] […] said, [t]he beginning of all sins is pride». Like Augustine, Aquinas 
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adds, «[h]e obviously is speaking of pride as it is the inordinate desire to excel» 
(Aquinas, 1965, question 84, article 2, p. 67).  
The problem of pride, for these religious thinkers, is both that it makes 
us forget God, and that it makes us focus on ourselves in an inflated way. By 
being prey to an «obsessive orientation of the self to its own excellence» (Boyd, 
2014, p. 250), not only do we lose the grace of God, but we also sever our links 
with the other human beings. We are vicious because of our vainglory – we 
imagine we can take God’s place1 – and because of our arrogance toward others; 
by thinking of ourselves as superior, we falsely believe in our self-sufficiency, 
thus forgetting that we instead rely on others for so many aspects of our existence. 
In so doing, we depart from «the virtues of acknowledged dependence» which 
reflect our nature of «dependent rational animals».2 
«Pride was not created for human beings, or violent anger for those 
born of women», Sirach (verse 18) continues. Superbia – i.e., pride – will only 
lead us to perdition; on the contrary, humility should be our leading virtue: «The 
Lord overthrows the thrones of rulers, and enthrones the lowly in their place. 
The Lord plucks up the roots of the nations, and plants the humble in their 
place» (Sirach, verses 14–15). And Augustine emphasizes that it is the humble 
that will be granted heavens, not the proud, for whom there is no room in the 
Heavenly City. The latter are doomed to live in the Earthly City, which is ruled 
by «the love of self». 3 
By being conceived as «a direct challenge to God and to others» (Boyd, 
2014, p. 245), pride ends up being the master sin. But what if one does not 
believe in God? Is pride still a vice, when seen from an entirely mundane, human 
point of view? Notwithstanding pride’s bad reputation, in what follows I want to 
 
1 «The conclusion, then, is that the Devil would not have begun by an open and obvious sin to 
tempt man into doing something which God had forbidden, had not man already begun to seek 
satisfaction in himself and, consequently, to take pleasure in the words: “You shall be as Gods”» 
(Augustine, bk. 14, ch. 13, p. 382). As Baasten observes, commenting on Gregory the Great’s 
Moralia, «[p]ride involves an attempt to usurp the place of God» (Baasten, 1986, p. 19). 
2 Boyd, 2014, p. 246, referring to MacIntyre, 1999. Boyd offers a good reconstruction of the 
history of pride in the Christian tradition. But see Gregory 2015, esp. for the role of pride in 
Sirach. For a more general history of pride, see Lyman, 1989, ch. 4. For a general examination of 
pride, esp. in relation to racial and national identities, see Dyson, 2006. 
3 «In fact, this is the main difference which distinguishes the two cities of which we are speaking. 
The humble City is the society of holy men and good angels; the proud city is the society of wicked 
men and evil angels. The one City began with the love of God; the other had its beginnings in the 
love of self» (Augustine, 2008, bk. 14, ch. 13, p. 382).  
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defend it as a master virtue. My two allies in this task are Bernard Mandeville and 
David Hume. I shall first show how Mandeville’s satirical consideration of 
morality helps to understand pride as an emotion that does not have the negative 
effects on others feared by Christianity. According to Mandeville’s exposition, 
pride is a fundamental element for the prosperity of society; nevertheless, it 
remains a vice for the person who feels it. I shall then next consider Hume, for 
whom pride is not only beneficial for others but also plays a fundamental role in 
spelling out the identity of the virtuous agent. I finish by arguing that it is not 
pride but humility that should be regarded as morally disputable. 
 
2. Mandeville: Pride and the Counterfeit of Virtue 
 
In The Fable of the Bees, Mandeville presents pride as an indispensable element 
for the wealth of society and for the thriving of a powerful nation4:  
 
Pride is that Natural Faculty by which every Mortal that has any 
Understanding over-values, and imagines better Things of himself than 
any impartial Judge, thoroughly acquainted with all his Qualities and 
Circumstances, could allow him. We are possess’d of no other Quality 
so beneficial to Society, and so necessary to render it wealthy and 
flourishing as this, yet it is that which is most generally detested. 
(Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, Remark M, p. 124)  
 
 
4 This is how pride is introduced by Mandeville: 
As Pride and Luxury decrease, 
So by degrees they leave the Seas. 
Not Merchants now, but Companies 
Remove whole Manufactories. 
All Arts and Crafts neglected lie; 
Content, the Bane of Industry,  
Makes ’em admire their homely Store, 
And neither seek nor covet more.  
[…] 
Fraud, Luxury, and Pride must live, 
While we the Benefits receive.  
(Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, The Grumbling Hive, pp. 34–35, 36) 
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If pride is lacking, idleness and decadence follow, and society will inevitably 
perish. Pride is universally taken to be a negative trait of character; yet able 
politicians, Mandeville claims, can use this passion to make people act in ways 
that will promote the good of the community at large. As expressed in 
Mandeville’s infamous formula: «Private Vices by the dextrous Management of a 
skilful Politician may be turned into Publick Benefits» (Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, 
A Search into the Nature of Society, p. 369)5.  
When seen from this angle, pride does present a positive aspect, and 
this depends on its wickedness when considered as related to the individual6. If 
pride remains a vice in the latter case, this is because of Mandeville’s description 
of virtue, which in fact reminds one of the Christian take on it. Mandeville 
attributes «the Name of VIRTUE to every Performance, by which Man, contrary 
to the impulse of Nature, should endeavour the Benefit of others, or the 
Conquest of his own Passions out of a Rational Ambition of being good» 
(Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue, pp. 48–
49). So on the face of it, being virtuous is a rational endeavour that goes against 
the appetites and emotional impulses that dominate human nature. Real virtue 
consists in «Victory over the Passions», while «Counterfeited Virtue» is just «a 
Conquest which one Passion obtains over another» (Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, 
Remark T, p. 230). Also, «no Action is such [virtuous], which does not suppose 
and point at some Conquest or other, some Victory great or small over untaught 
Nature; otherwise the Epithet is improper» (Mandeville, 1988, vol. 2, Third 
Dialogue, p. 109).  
Nevertheless, as improper as it might be, counterfeited virtue seems 
eventually to be the only form of morality human beings can really have access 
 
5  On pride in Mandeville, see Dickey, 1990; Tolonen, 2013, ch. 2; Verburg, 2015. On the 
history of the development of pride in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Lovejoy, 
1961. 
6 According to Mandeville, «not the Good and Amiable, but the Bad and Hateful Qualities of Man, 
his Imperfections and the want of Excellencies which other Creatures are endued with, are the 
first Causes that made Man sociable beyond other Animals the Moment after he lost Paradise; and 
that if he had remain’d in his primitive Innocence, and continued to enjoy the Blessings that 
attended it, there is no Shadow of Probability that he ever would have become that sociable 
Creature he is now». This being the case, «the more their Pride and Vanity are display’d, and all 
their Desires enlarg’d, the more capable they must be of being rais’d into large and vastly 
numerous Societies» (Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, A Search into the Nature of Society, pp. 344, 
346–347). 
 
On Pride                                                                         105 
 
to. As it happens, reason is far from being the strongest among human 
motivational principles. When human beings display a virtuous conduct, this is 
not to be traced back to the working of reason, but to those very passions over 
which true morality (that is, real virtue) is instead supposed to prevail: «Whereas 
if Reason in Man was of equal weight with his Pride, he could never be pleas’d 
with Praises, which he is conscious he don’t deserve» (Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, 
Remark C, p. 63). Pride is ineradicable from human nature7, but pride can be 
put to good use by «the skilful Management of wary Politicians» (Mandeville, 
1988, vol. 1, An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue, p. 51) to make society 
flourish. And if there is any hope that people will behave morally, even though 
just on the surface, that is because they have pride, and want to appear morally 
respectable in the eyes of those around them, and be esteemed and admired and 
applauded by them: «Thus Sagacious Moralists draw Men like Angels, in hopes 
that the Pride at least of Some will put ’em upon copying after the beautiful 
Originals which they are represented to be» (Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, An 
Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue, p. 52)8.  
In the opposition between real virtue and counterfeited virtue provided 
above, the former comes to be defeated, given what human nature consists in. 
Those traits of character that are generally depicted as good and to be pursued 
are in fact just a façade that conceals the real drives that move human beings to 
action. And the greatest Christian virtue, humility, is nothing but a form of 
concealed pride:  
 
[T]he humblest Man alive must confess, that the Reward of a Virtuous 
Action, which is the Satisfaction that ensues upon it, consists in a certain 
 
7 «Human Nature is every where the same: Genius, Wit and Natural Parts are always sharpened by 
Application, and may be as much improv’d in the Practice of the meanest Villany, as they can in 
the Exercise of Industry or the most Heroic Virtue. There is no Station of Life, where Pride, 
Emulation, and the Love of Glory may not be displayed» (Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, An Essay on 
Charity and Charity-Schools, p. 275). 
8  Mandeville’s definition of pride follows his definition of «self-liking» as given in The Third 
Dialogue between Horatio and Cleomenes: «to encrease the Care in Creatures to preserve 
themselves», Cleomenes argues, «Nature has given them an Instinct, by which every Individual 
values itself above its real Worth; this in us, I mean, in Man, seems to be accompany’d with a 
Diffidence, arising from a Consciousness, or at least an Apprehension, that we do over-value 
ourselves: It is this that makes us so fond of the Approbation, Liking and Assent of others; because 
they strengthen and confirm us in the good Opinion we have of ourselves». And Horatio comments 
that «Self-liking is evidently Pride» (Mandeville, 1988, vol. 2, p. 130, 131). 
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Pleasure he procures to himself by Contemplating on his own Worth: 
Which Pleasure, together with the Occasion of it, are as certain Signs of 
Pride, as looking Pale and Trembling at any imminent Danger, are the 
Symptoms of Fear. (Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, An Enquiry into the 
Origin of Moral Virtue, p. 57)  
 
If talking of humility makes any sense, this is in terms of «the Passion of Shame» 
(Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, Remark C, p. 64), and shame, far from corresponding 
to that humility so much praised by the divines as the virtue that brings us close 
to God and our fellow creatures, is just the other face of pride itself:  
 
The Reverse of Shame is Pride, yet no Body can be touch’d with the first, 
that never felt any thing of the latter; for that we have such an 
extraordinary Concern in what others think of us, can proceed from 
nothing but the vast Esteem we have for our selves. (Mandeville, 1988, 
vol. 1, Remark C, pp. 66–67)9  
 
That being said, it is the case that for Mandeville in both pride and shame «the 
Seeds of most Virtues are contained» (Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, Remark C, p. 
67). Both passions spring from vanity and the desire for honour and praise, 
which are intrinsic to human nature. Notwithstanding Mandeville’s declaration 
that real virtue corresponds to the refusal of that very nature – «but I see no Self-
denial», Mandeville complains, «without which there can be no Virtue» 
(Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, Remark O, p. 156) – it is pride that allows human 
beings to adopt that countenance that allows them to live together harmoniously, 
thereby improving their condition in ways that would be precluded if real virtue 
were in place10. Mandeville, therefore, turns what for the Christian narrative is 
 
9 In Remark R (1988, vol.1, p. 209), Mandeville says: «Do but increase Man’s Pride, and his fear 
of Shame will ever be proportion’d to it; for the greater Value a Man sets upon himself, the more 
Pains he’ll take and the greater Hardships he’ll undergo to avoid Shame». 
10 «Ashamed of the many Frailties they feel within, all Men endeavour to hide themselves, their 
Ugly Nakedness, from each other, and wrapping up the true Motives of their Hearts in the 
Specious Cloke of Sociableness, and their Concern for the publick Good, they are in hopes of 
concealing their filthy Appetites and the Deformity of their Desires; whilst they are conscious 
within of the Fondness for their darling Lusts, and their Incapacity, barefac’d, to tread the 
arduous, rugged Path of Virtue» (Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, Remark T, pp. 234–235). 
 
On Pride                                                                         107 
 
completely vicious into something that, although not virtuous, is nonetheless to 
be considered at the root of the civilizing process of mankind11. 
It is a merit of Mandeville that he unmasks the hypocrisy that lies at the 
heart of the Christian treatment of pride. If pride is to be condemned, this is not 
so much because it represents an offence against God, but rather because it 
threatens to cut ourselves off from other people. Yet, Mandeville shows that the 
result of the working of pride is the exact opposite: given our tendency to 
exaggerate our importance and our need to be acknowledged by others, pride 
reveals itself to be fundamental in establishing those bonds among people that 
permit society to thrive. Ultimately, pride is also beneficial to the individual, as 
it adjusts one’s character to properly fit into society in accordance with one’s 
temper12. Even so, in Mandeville’s picture pride remains a vice. This is due to 
his «anatomy» (Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, The Preface, p. 3) of human nature, 
which he regards as prey to intrinsically degenerated passions, desires and 
appetites.  
 
3. Hume: Well-founded Pride 
 
If we look at Hume, the picture changes again. Like Mandeville, Hume too views 
pride as a trait of character that is fundamentally advantageous, both individually 
and socially. However, Humean pride lacks those ethically negative aspects that 
are still present in Mandeville’s depiction of it. This is due to Hume’s different 
approach to morality, which is not seen by him as a rational endeavour, but 
instead as an outcome of the sentimental nature of human beings. The exposure 
of morality by Mandeville as hypocritical is the outcome of the still lingering 
influence of the Augustinian tradition in his approach (see Herdt, 2008, pp. 
307–308). On the contrary, Hume conceives human nature and the morality 
that follows from it as entirely naturalized, consciously leaving behind all 
possible religious assumptions. In this new scenario of thought, pride fully 
 
11 «[A]fterwards, our Pride, Sloth, Sensuality and Fickleness are the great Patrons that promote 
all Arts and Sciences, Trades, Handicrafts and Callings; while the great Task-masters, Necessity, 
Avarice, Envy, and Ambition, each in the Class that belongs to him, keep the Members of the 
Society to their labour, and make them all submit, most of them chearfully, to the Drudgery of 
their Station; Kings and Princes not excepted» (Mandeville, 1988, vol. 1, A Search into the Nature 
of Society, p. 366). 
12 See in this regard Mandeville’s description of the effect of pride on two people, one with an 
active temper and the other with an indolent one, in The Third Dialogue between Horatio and 
Cleomenes (Mandeville, 1988, vol. 2, pp. 109–119). 
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acquires the status of virtue. Hume’s account represents one of the most 
convincing vindications of pride as virtue; to understand why, it is now necessary 
to tackle Hume’s view on pride in more detail. 
Hume provides a composite explanation of pride in line with his 
associationism, as developed in A Treatise of Human Nature. Pride – and its 
opposite, humility – are passions that are structured according to a «double 
relation of ideas and impressions» (Hume, 2007, bk. 2, part 1, sect. 5, para. 5). 
When the idea of a certain thing that we find pleasant is related to the idea of 
ourselves, it causes in us an agreeable impression, the impression of pride. The 
same goes with humility, the only difference being that the thing associated to 
ourselves is painful, thus provoking a disagreeable impression when related to 
ourselves (see Hume, 2007, bk. 2, part 1, sect. 2, para. 4; bk. 2, part 1, sect. 5, 
para. 5; bk. 2, part 1, sect. 9, para. 6). Notwithstanding the complex 
constitution of pride and humility, Hume also says that they are experienced as 
unitary and simple impressions, without consciously going through the 
different passages just mentioned 13 . So pride is recognised by us in 
phenomenological terms as «that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, 
when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us satisfied 
with ourselves» (Hume, 2007, bk. 2, part 1, sect. 7, para. 8).  
The causes of pride are numerous, from qualities of our mind (for 
example, «wit, good-sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity», Hume, 2007, 
bk. 2, part 1, sect. 2, para. 5) and body (for example, «beauty, strength, agility, 
good mein, address in dancing, riding, fencing, and […] dexterity in any manual 
business or manufacture», Hume, 2007, bk. 2, part 1, sect. 2, para. 5), to 
whatever is related to ourselves (for example, «[o]ur country, family, children, 
relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths», Hume, 2007, bk. 2, 
part 1, sect. 2, para. 5). Among those causes virtue stands out:  
 
For if all morality be founded on the pain or pleasure, which arises from 
the prospect of any loss or advantage, that may result from our own 
characters, or from those of others, all the effects of morality must be 
 
13  «THE passions of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and uniform impressions, ’tis 
impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of 
the passions. The utmost we can pretend to is a description of them, by an enumeration of such 
circumstances, as attend them: But as these words, pride and humility, are of general use, and the 
impressions they represent the most common of any, every one, of himself, will be able to form a 
just idea of them, without any danger of mistake» (Hume, 2007, bk. 2, part 1, sect. 2, para. 1). 
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deriv’d from the same pain or pleasure, and among the rest, the passions 
of pride and humility. The very essence of virtue, according to this 
hypothesis, is to produce pleasure, and that of vice to give pain. The 
virtue and vice must be part of our character in order to excite pride or 
humility. What farther proof can we desire for the double relation of 
impressions and ideas? (Hume, 2007, bk. 2, part 1, sect. 7, para. 4)  
 
Hume establishes a straight link between virtue and pride, presenting pride as a 
necessary element for our development as virtuous agents. This link relies on 
the fact that we are related at the sentimental level; thanks to sympathy, we react 
to the opinions of one another and depend on those opinions to draw a correct 
picture of who we are, both in our eyes and in the eyes of others. In turn, this 
same sympathetic interconnection among human beings is what gives rise to the 
common point of view from which we morally assess ourselves and other people.  
This is not the place to deal with the specificity of Hume’s explanation 
of the formation of the moral point of view (for a discussion of this point, and for 
secondary literature, see Greco, 2018). Suffice it to say here that, like 
Mandeville, Hume too argues that pride cannot emerge but in a context that is 
social, within which pride reveals itself as a fundamentally beneficial trait. 
Differently from Mandeville though, pride for Hume is not a private vice that 
happens to be advantageous to society; pride is virtuous, both at the individual 
and collective levels, since it is the passion responsible for shaping the virtuous 
agent. The novelty in Hume is his identification of the virtuous agent with the 
proud person; it is a key element of ethical behaviour that the virtuous agent be 
indeed proud of his or her ethical character. This marks a stark difference not 
only from the Christian tradition but also from Mandeville, with whom Hume’s 
treatment of pride has otherwise so much in common. In Hume, in fact, not only 
does pride allow people to be more proactive, thus making them capable of 
succeeding in their activities and of contributing to the good of society; being 
proud is also a trait that deserves to be praised for its own sake (see Taylor, 2015, 
ch. 5.4).  
For this to happen, however, pride needs to be regulated: «An excessive 
pride or over-weaning conceit of ourselves is always esteem’d vicious, and is 
universally hated» (Hume, 2007, bk. 3, part 3, sect. 2, para. 1). As noted by 
Gabriele Taylor, pride is «an emotion of self-assessment» (Taylor, 1985), that is, 
it is a passion (to use Hume’s terminology) that is self-directed; the proud 
person focuses on himself or herself, and this may have the unfortunate result of 
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making the proud person odious to others. It is a general rule that «the proud 
never can endure the proud» (Hume, 2007, bk. 3, part 3, sect. 2, para. 7); 
besides, more often than not, our pride is nothing but a form of vanity 14 . 
However frequent this may be, this is not always the case. There is, in fact, a 
subtle but clear dissimilarity between our feelings of pride and vanity. Alison 
McIntyre explains this clearly:  
 
[T]he qualities that give rise to pride will be the same as those that give 
rise to approval from others, but in feeling pride in the face of praise, 
one’s attention is directed, by the principles of sympathy and authority, 
to the grounds for the praise. On Hume’s account, praise intensifies 
pride because it indicates grounds for pride, not because it constitutes 
ground for pride itself (T 2.1.11.9; SBN 316–24). (McIntyre, 2014, p. 
154) 
 
Eventually, Hume’s description of the truly proud person diverges from that of 
the vain person. His advocacy of true pride is freed from any form of hypocrisy 
and validates pride as an important moral passion. The distinction between 
«proto-pride» and «well-founded pride» in Hume drawn by Pauline Chazan (see 
Chazan, 1992 and 1998, ch.1) comes to our aid in further clarifying this point.  
Chazan moves from the observation that there may occur situations in 
which pride arises inappropriately. Take the case, Chazan argues, of an acrobat 
who is proud of the public’s admiration of her agility and flexibility. This 
admiration, and consequent pride, contributes to realising the consciousness 
the acrobat has of herself as someone with those particular gifts. And yet, Chazan 
stresses, there is no certainty that the public admires her, as opposed to 
admiring, for example, a well-performed exercise, without considering the 
performer. The acrobat may well continue to believe, erroneously, that the 
public admires her; what is given is the pleasure of the public, but the pride the 
acrobat feels may not correspond to what, in reality, this pleasure refers to. This, 
for Chazan, is a case of proto-pride, and differs from pride proper in that it is a 
deceptive interpretation of the pleased response of others as if this were directed 
to us as owners of the admired quality. A case of proto-pride is also presented by 
Hume when he describes the vain guest at a banquet who boasts about the 
 
14 It is not by chance that Hume often talks of «pride or vanity» (Hume, 2007, bk. 2, part 1, sect. 
2, para. 6; bk. 2, part 1, sect. 10, para. 10; Hume, 1983, vol. 3, ch. 68, para. 7). For the relation 
between pride and vanity in Hume see Reed, 2012, and Galvagni, unpublished manuscript.  
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success of the event as if he himself had organized it (see Hume, 2007, bk. 2, 
part 1, sect.6, para. 2). 
This is not to say that proto-pride is not a real passion; the acrobat and 
the vain guest both feel pride to all intents and purposes. The difference between 
proto-pride and well-founded pride is that what results from proto-pride is a self-
consciousness that is unsteady and dependent on the fortuitous occasions in 
which one happens to feel pride for something that in reality could be associated 
with us only by chance, if at all. There is a difference between simply feeling pride, 
which can occur in situations like that of the acrobat and the vain guest, and 
feeling to be worthy of pride15. The latter case implies being conscious that one’s 
pride is due to the appreciation bestowed upon those qualities of our person that 
really belong to us and individuate us. A pride of this type is not derived from 
transient pleasures that are only incidentally connected to the person feeling this 
passion, but from an evaluation of the qualities of the person that may be called 
virtues in their own right.  
Chazan moves from this distinction to argue that it is possible to pin 
down a stable sense of self by referring to well-founded pride. She calls it a «non-
metaphysical self», since it does not correspond to the bundle of perceptions 
Hume discusses in the chapter of the Treatise (bk. 1, part 4, sect. 6) devoted to 
personal identity. On the contrary, the passion of pride allows us to conceive the 
self as a unified agent. Such a different perspective on the self in Hume is 
highlighted by numerous scholars 16 , and emerges from the positive self-
 
15 On the difference between simply feeling pride and the consciousness of being worthy of praise, 
see Árdal, 1989. This point was also amply developed by Adam Smith (see Smith, 2002, part 7, 
sect. 2, ch. 4). On the same note, according to Gabriele Taylor, the attitude of the vain «is not that 
of a person who is secure in her self-esteem. On the contrary, she seeks to find her own value in 
the judgement of others. She therefore will tend to take pleasure in every favourable opinion about 
herself which she can gather, and be depressed by any adverse one, quite regardless of its 
appropriateness or truth. She clings to the opinions of others since on these hinges her self-
evaluation. But this leaves her in a precarious position, for the response of others is hardly 
something to be relied upon, especially if what satisfies the vain is flattery rather than honest 
conviction. Others may not wish to play the game, may change their minds, and so on» (Taylor, 
2006, pp. 72–73). 
16 For example, Jane McIntyre says that «Book 2 depicts the role of the passions in the creation of 
a self which is unified through time. It details how the Humean self can be affected by its past and 
concerned with its future» (McIntyre, 1989, p. 557). According to Amélie Rorty, «[t]he idea of 
the self produced by pride is that of the self as an agent, with a concern for its future, an agent who 
has reasons to weight the motivational force of her passions, to give them a ranked priority beyond 
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evaluation generated by our feeling justifiably proud for who we are. «But tho’ 
an over-weaning conceit of our own merit be vicious and disagreeable», Hume 
notices, «nothing can be more laudable, than to have a value for ourselves, where 
we really have qualities that are valuable» (Hume, 2007, bk. 3, part 3, sect. 2, 
para. 8). The self-confidence supplied by a well-grounded pride roots our sense 
of being a recognisable individual, with a clear practical identity:  
 
[A]nd ’tis certain, that nothing is more useful to us in the conduct of life, 
than a due degree of pride, which makes us sensible of our own merit, 
and gives us a confidence and assurance in all our projects and 
enterprizes. Whatever capacity any one may be endow’d with, ’tis 
entirely useless to him, if he be not acquainted with it, and form not 
designs suitable to it. ’Tis requisite on all occasions to know our own 
force; and were it allowable to err on either side, twou’d be more 
advantageous to overrate our merit, than to form ideas of it, below its 
just standard. Fortune commonly favours the bold and enterprizing; and 
nothing inspires us with more boldness than a good opinion of ourselves. 
(Hume, 2007, bk. 3, part 3, sect. 2, para. 8) 
 
Commenting on the nature of the proud person, Tara Smith claims that «[t]he 
proud person is his own in the truest sense, by winning his own approbation. 
Self-evaluation is what counts. The good opinion that a proud person seeks is 
his own» (Smith, 1998, p. 75). This is true for Hume too, since it is only from 
within himself or herself that eventually the proud person can obtain the final 
confirmation of his or her value17. Such self-confirmation, however, finds its 
 
previously experienced pleasurable intensity and duration» (Rorty, 1990, p. 258) Similarly to 
Chazan, Gerald Postema too observes that «[t]he self of which we speak here is not the subject of 
the philosophical debate over personal identity famously discussed in Treatise, Book 1. Rather, 
the self of Treatise, Book 2 is the focus of “the concern we take in ourselves” (T 1.4.6.5; SBN 
253), our “present concern for our past or future pleasures and pains” (T 1.4.6.19; SBN 261). 
This is not a metaphysical substance, but the relatively (but contingently) stable focus of practical 
concern. This self, Hume tells us, can only exist by contextual comparison» (Postema, 2005, p. 
267). On this sense of the Humean self, see Greco, 2015. 
17 This is acknowledged by Gabriele Taylor as well: «The discussion of the Humean system has 
made it plain that an analysis of pride must be in terms of the agent’s own view of the situation, 
where this includes both, how he sees his own role within this situation, and his evaluation of this 
or that aspect of it» (Taylor, 1980, p. 392). Note, however, that in the end Taylor considers pride 
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surest support in our acknowledgement of the importance of ethics in defining 
who we are18. Other people’s opinions as carried by sympathy do matter in our 
feeling positively or negatively about ourselves – «the mind of men are mirrors 
to one another» (Hume, 2007, bk. 2, part 2, sect. 5, para. 21), Hume says – but 
only a judgment on ourselves asserted from the common point of view of 
morality possesses that stability that allows us to acquire a firm consciousness of 
ourselves.  
According to Gabriele Taylor, Hume is convinced that «we are proud of 
qualities etc. only in so far as they are likely to gain the admiration and approval 
of society» (Taylor, 1985, p. 26). Yet, this is an imprecise reading of Hume. 
Validation by society alone is insufficient; only when our pride is indeed a solid, 
reflectively sustained «pride in virtue» (see Baier, 1980 and 1991, ch. 8; Besser, 
2010; Taylor, 2011 and 2015, ch. 5) can we consider ourselves as fully-fledged 
virtuous agents. It is our taking part in virtue for Hume that reinforces our sense 
of ourselves through the passion of pride, not just the superficial fact that 
someone shows interest or applauds us – be it an audience for whom we are 
performing, or the whole of our society judging us (think in this sense about a 
recalcitrant who does not agree with the mainstream of his or her community, 
for example an anti-Fascist in Fascist Italy)19. Jacqueline Taylor nicely articulates 
this:  
 
[T]he virtuous person is not proud of her virtue simply because others 
approve of her, nor does she act virtuously to gain others’ approval. In 
possessing the traits of kindness and pride in virtue, she has traits that 
others value, and which make her praiseworthy in their eyes. The 
 
to be a vice. Given her neo-Aristotelian stance, whereby the fully virtuous «get their reasoning 
right, they possess practical wisdom, a kind of knowledge or sensitivity», pride – especially when 
it takes the forms of vanity, conceit, and arrogance – ends up focussing excessively «on the self 
and its position in the world, [becoming] destructive of that self and [preventing] its flourishing» 
(Taylor, 2006, pp. 2, 1).  
18 For Tara Smith too, «[w]hile the feeling of being pleased with oneself may arise for all sorts of 
reasons, admirable and not so admirable, the virtue of pride occurs only as an outgrowth of 
authentically moral practice. The feeling of pride must be harnessed to morally right belief and 
action in order to reflect the virtue of pride». And then, «[p]ride is the commitment to achieve 
one’s moral excellence» (Smith, 1998, pp. 75, 76). 
19 The capacity that pride in virtue gives us to stay true in the face of contempt, or explicit hostility, 
from our community opens up interesting developments regarding the relation between Humean 
pride and political dissent. However, this inquiry requires more space than can be devoted here. I 
wish to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me.  
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approval of others is a recognition that she is valuable, and her response 
of pride is an affirmation of her self-worth. […] Pride makes us aware of 
ourselves as the possessor of valuable qualities, the value of which is 
shared by others who admire or esteem us for these qualities. (Taylor, 
2011, p. 271) 
 
On her part, Annette Baier speaks of a «mutual reinforcement» between pride and 
virtue:  
 
The merger of corrected pride with the moral sentiment is seen not only 
by the fact that pride accompanies discernment of virtue but by the fact 
that pride may accompany virtue, so that one’s own discerned pride in 
virtue will be a further proof of virtue and a further occasion for pride. 
Virtuous pride in virtue reinforces both pride and virtue, so that pride and 
the moral sense become lost in one another. (Baier, 1980, p. 417) 
 
With pride in virtue we are justly proud of ourselves as the possessors of those 
virtuous traits that define us as virtuous agents. When this happens, a virtuous 
circle is established between virtuous action and self-esteem, with the result that 
our moral character comes out stronger. So pride in virtue constitutes both a form 
of self-evaluation, in the form of the self-respect we develop as bearers of virtuous 
characters, and a motivating drive to act according to virtue. In fact, although pride 
for Hume is not a direct motive to action (see Reed, 2012; Taylor, 2015, ch. 2.2), 
nonetheless – in Tara Smith’s words – it «heightens and fortifies one’s 
commitment to other moral virtues», serving «as an engine of morality […] 
propelling a person’s moral growth». In this sense, pride can well be taken as a 
«healthy love of self» (Smith, 1998, pp. 81, 82, 85). Smith does not examine pride 
from a Humean perspective, but what she says in this regard suits Hume well20.  
 
4. Pagan Virtue 
 
Hume offers a sophisticated illustration of what pride consists in that helps us to 
put this passion in the right light. Pride indeed revolves around the self and 
 
20 Arnold Isenberg says something similar: «Pride, from a psychological standpoint, is pleasure 
taken in the possession of some quality that one deems valuable […] A genuine and reasonable 
pride, from the ethical standpoint, will depend on a comprehensive and just sense of values» 
(Isenberg, 1980, p. 358). 
On Pride                                                                         115 
 
discloses itself within a social dimension: «Our reputation, our character, our 
name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other 
causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence, when not 
seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others» (Hume, 2007, bk. 2, part 
1, sect. 11, para. 1). We resonate with others, and our self-appraisal is directly 
affected by the feedback we get from those around us. In this continual rebound 
of reciprocal assessments we test our self-esteem, hence putting on the line our 
very sense of ourselves as agents. This is partly related to Mandeville’s belief that 
pride is a necessary vice, in which by centring on ourselves we all the same make 
society prosper. The sharp difference is that for Hume pride is not a vice, even 
less a sin21. Pride, Hume tells us, is a virtue, and this is basically because thanks 
to pride the moral agent becomes visible. In so doing, pride works as «a meta- 
or regulative virtue» (Herdt, 2008, p. 313), putting in motion a reflective 
process of self-confirmation that is dependent on the sympathetic nature of 
human relations: 
 
Who indeed does not feel an accession of alacrity in his pursuits of 
knowledge and ability of every kind, when he considers, that besides the 
advantage, which immediately result from these acquisitions, they also 
give him a new lustre in the eyes of mankind, and are universally 
attended with esteem and approbation? And who can think any 
advantages of fortune a sufficient compensation for the least breach of 
the social virtues, when he considers, that not only his character with 
regard to others, but also his peace and inward satisfaction entirely 
depend upon his strict observance of them; and that a mind will never be 
able to bear its own survey, that has been wanting in its part to mankind 
and society? (Hume, 2007, bk. 3, part 3, sect. 6, para. 6)22 
 
21  Consider in this regard Hume’s defence of luxury from the accusation of being vicious, as 
presented in Of Refinement in the Arts. As Hume remarks, «[i]s it not very inconsistent for an 
author to assert in one page, that moral distinctions are inventions of politicians for public 
interest; and in the next page maintain, that vice is advantageous to the public? And indeed it 
seems upon any system of morality, little less than a contradiction in terms, to talk of a vice, which 
is in general beneficial to society» (Hume, 1985b, 280). Mandeville is never mentioned in Of 
Refinement in the Arts, but it is plain that he is the main target of Hume. 
22 Jennifer Herdt quotes this passage too, and adds: «Were we not capable of pride, and through 
sympathy capable of having our pride damaged or reinforced by the ways others assess us, we 
would not be able to act in accordance with moral judgments that strain against our own self-
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 In this progression toward the affirmation of a well-grounded self, ethics plays 
an indispensable role. It is in fact pride in virtue that provides solidity to our 
selves as moral agents, guaranteeing that the qualities for which we praise 
ourselves, and are praised by others, are not transitory and accidental, but 
essentially belong to our characters. 
 Notice that Hume never presents morality as hypocritical. There can, 
of course, be cases in which our abiding by virtue is insincere. But this is not 
always necessarily so, nor do these cases prove anything with regard to morality 
as a universal fraud. The crucial point is that within the Humean framework 
virtue is the product of a human nature that reveals itself through passions and 
affections such as pride, and the closer morality is brought to human nature, the 
less morality can be seen as hypocritical. On the contrary, when morality is 
detached from human nature – as is the case with Mandeville, who considers 
human appetites and desires as degenerate because of a moral standard based 
on reason and self-denial – it is easy to reduce morality to nothing but a 
masquerade. Things go even worse when morality is made dependent on 
religion; Hume’s defense of pride also proceeds through a head-on attack 
against this latter way of understanding morality.  
 Hume deems virtuous a trait of character that is either useful or 
immediately agreeable to other people or to oneself, and pride is indeed useful 
and agreeable to the person who possesses it (see Hume, 2007, bk. 3, part 3, 
sect. 2, para. 14). In making us sensible to our own merit, and in giving us 
confidence in our projects and enterprises, pride is by all means virtuous, since 
someone who is self-aware of his or her own true value will be more successful 
in his or her undertakings23. However, pride can also be useful and agreeable to 
others, thus meeting all the four criteria for a trait of character to be virtuous in 
Humean terms. By being self-reliant, we can grow well-balanced connections 
with those around us, developing a more precise sense of other people’s 
individualities and of the relations they have with us, ending up treating them in 
morally appropriate ways. Thanks to pride, we can thus be recognised and 
valued by others as «a safe companion, an easy friend, a gentle master, an 
 
interest or limited generosity. We would not, in short, be able to sustain the practice of morality, 
although we would still display natural virtues in some limited contexts, showing generosity 
toward friends and care for our dependent children (T 316–24)» (Herdt, 2008, p. 313). 
23  This applies to pride understood both as a moral virtue and as an intellectual one. On 
intellectual virtue in Hume, see O’Brien, 2018. 
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agreeable husband, or an indulgent father» (Hume, 2007, bk. 3, part 3, sect. 3, 
para. 9). Far from being egoistic, pride is the passion that makes us reach out to 
other people, and that is possible because pride gives us that self-assurance that 
stabilises our identity as moral agents.  
 When pride is framed in those terms, it is naturally paired with 
«modesty, or a just sense of our weakness» (Hume, 2007, bk. 3, part 3, sect. 2, 
para. 1). «[A] genuine and hearty pride, or self-esteem, if well conceal’d and well 
founded» (Hume, 2007, bk. 3, part 3, sect. 2, para. 11) will not be blatantly 
exhibited. It is part and parcel of such a passion to be controlled and self-
regulated, thus being vented with due regard to other people’s pride and sense 
of themselves. If humility is ever felt in those circumstances, it never «goes 
beyond the outside» (Hume, 2007, bk. 3, part 3, sect. 2, para. 11). Modesty and 
humility should not be confused with one another (see Baier, 1991, p. 206; 
Martin, 1992, p. 287). The former is in harmony with the sensible self-
awareness acquired through a well-founded pride:  
 
Modesty may be understood in different senses, […] [b]ut its most usual 
meaning is when it is opposed to impudence and arrogance, and 
expresses a diffidence of our own judgment, and a due attention and 
regard for others. In young men chiefly, this quality is a sure sign of good 
sense; and is also the certain means of augmenting that endowment, by 
preserving their ears open to instruction, and making them still grasp 
after new attainments. (Hume, 1998, sect. 8, para. 8) 
 
We show modesty when we recognise our own limits, and this is not a denial of 
pride, but instead its very confirmation 24 . Instead, being humble is almost 
certainly a sign of a vicious character in Hume’s eyes. When arguing about the 
various expressions well-established pride can take, Hume mentions «heroic 
virtue», or «greatness and elevation of mind», as it manifests itself in traits of 
character such as «[c]ourage, intrepidity, ambition, love or glory, magnanimity, 
 
24  «[A] generous spirit and self-value, well founded, decently disguised, and courageously 
supported under distress and calumny, is a great excellency, and seems to derive its merit from the 
noble elevation of its sentiment, or its immediate agreeableness to its possessor. In ordinary 
characters, we approve of a bias towards modesty, which is a quality immediately agreeable to 
others: The vicious excess of the former virtue, namely, insolence or haughtiness, is immediately 
disagreeable to others: The excess of the latter is so to the possessor. Thus are the boundaries of 
these duties adjusted» (Hume, 1998, sect. 8, para. 10). 
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and all the other shining virtues of that kind» (Hume, 2007, bk. 3, part 3, sect. 
2, para. 13). It is the case that Christian thought denounces them as vices, but 
Hume strongly disagrees: 
 
Accordingly we find, that many religious declaimers decry those virtues 
as purely pagan and natural, and represent to us the excellency of the 
Christian religion, which places humility in the rank of virtues, and 
corrects the judgment of the world, and even of philosophers, who so 
generally admire all the efforts of pride and ambition. Whether this 
virtue of humility has been rightly understood, I shall not pretend to 
determine. I am content with the concession, that the world naturally 
esteems a well-regulated pride, which secretly animates our conduct, 
without breaking out into such indecent expressions of vanity, as may 
offend the vanity of others. (Hume, 2007, bk. 3, part 3, sect. 2, para. 
13)  
 
Again in Mandeville’s footsteps, Hume acknowledges that although humility has 
been constantly advocated as a virtue, «[t]he world naturally esteems a well-
regulated pride». Yet, in opposition to Mandeville, Hume does not see the praise 
of the world as inevitably inauthentic. If we want to find hypocrisy, we should 
instead look into the conduct of those divines who appear to be so fond of 
humility 25. Virtue and vice are dependent for Hume on people feeling pleasure 
and pain, which is a fact of experience that is derived from an unbiased 
observation of how human nature expresses itself. This being the case, if we take 
 
25 This is how Hume describes their behaviour in Of National Characters: «It must, therefore, 
happen, that clergymen, being drawn from the common mass of mankind, as people are to other 
employments, by the views of profit, the greater part, though no atheists or free-thinkers, will find 
it necessary, on particular occasions, to feign more devotion than they are, at that time, possessed 
of, and to maintain the appearance of fervor and seriousness, even when jaded with the exercises 
of their religion, or when they have their minds engaged in the common occupations of life. They 
must not, like the rest of the world, give scope to their natural movements and sentiments: They 
must set a guard over their looks and words and actions: And in order to support the veneration 
paid them by the multitude, they must not only keep a remarkable reserve, but must promote the 
spirit of superstition, by a continued grimace and hypocrisy. This dissimulation often destroys the 
candor and ingenuity of their temper, and makes an irreparable breach in their character. If by 
chance any of them be possessed of a temper more susceptible of devotion than usual, so that he 
has but little occasion for hypocrisy to support the character of his profession; it is so natural for 
him to over-rate this advantage, and to think that it atones for every violation of morality, that 
frequently he is not more virtuous than the hypocrite» (Hume, 1985a, footnote 3, pp. 199–200). 
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humility and all the other «monkish virtues» professed by Christian religion, 
like «[c]elibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, […] silence, 
solitude» (Hume, 1998, sect. 9, para. 3), they are most of the time only 
productive of suffering and unhappiness:  
 
[T]hey serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man’s 
fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of 
society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor 
increase his power of self-enjoyment […] on the contrary, […] they 
cross all these desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden 
the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper. (Hume, 1998, sect. 
9, para. 3) 
 
Monkish virtues, including humility, artificially force humanity in a direction 
that is both unnatural, unreasonable, and deeply vicious. Quite the contrary, 
what has been blamed as «the beginning of all sins» is, in fact, one of the ba sic 
ways human nature unfolds, and a necessary component of a virtuous life. 
«[S]omeone reared under conditions of constant humiliation will likely not 
develop a strong understanding of her place in the community», Margaret 
Watkins notes, «what she has to offer in relationships, or perhaps much of a 
sense of herself at all. But even those reared in better circumstances will 
discover vulnerabilities – holes in the self’s mosaic that need patching by the 
loving care of friends, family, and lovers. For Hume, this is a sign of humanity, 
not vice» (Watkins, 2019, p. 184). Be proud! Hume exhorts us, since that is 
the best way to promote virtue, while humility makes ourselves as well as 
others equally miserable. By advancing pride, Hume is therefore both 
putting aside religious morality and distancing himself from those attempts 
of downgrading ethics to nothing but a mockery of human narcissism, thus 
encouraging a pagan virtue 26  that is respectful of human nature and its 
constitutive passions. 
 
 
26 «Hume’s moral philosophy, then, is an explicit attempt to restore a fully pagan ethic, one that 
does not pay even lip service to Christianity. A character driven by pride and love of glory is frankly 
virtuous in Hume’s eyes. He utterly rejects an Augustinian moral psychology, no longer 
employing it even for satirical effect. There is no contrast between true virtue and apparently 
virtuous actions produced out of the desire to be loved and respected» (Herdt, 2008, p. 314). On 
the revival of pagan ethics, see Casey, 1991. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this essay, I have offered a vindication of pride. I started by presenting the 
Christian condemnation of pride as the cardinal sin; by pivoting on the self, 
pride both represents an affront against God and it draws us away from our fellow 
human beings. I then asked what is the status of pride for those who do not move 
from a religious perspective. In particular, I asked if pride is still a trait of 
character pernicious to other people. To answer this question, I examined 
Mandeville’s line of argument whereby pride can indeed be beneficial to society 
at large, although remaining a vice for the individual. Thus I argued that Hume’s 
account is an improvement on that of Mandeville. Hume’s view of morality as the 
outcome of human nature as seen in sentimental terms brings out the strengths 
of pride; pride is not vicious for the person who feels it, nor does the person need 
to assume a hypocritical countenance in his or her relations with others because 
of that. On the contrary, pride stabilizes the virtuous agent by creating a virtuous 
circle between our desire for self-appraisal and our aspiration to act morally. 
When seen through the Humean lens, pride reveals itself to be valuable both for 
the individual and for the community, hence qualifying as a virtue to all intents 
and purposes. Also, pride so understood allows us to appreciate modesty to the 
detriment of humility, which should instead be discarded as vicious.  
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